

Synchronization of IM and HC: The Navy Perspective

IM/EM Technology Symposium Munich, Germany

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- Purpose
- IM and HC background
- Testing criteria
- Navy synchronization of IM and HC
- Summary





- Introduce IM and HC
- Provide a background of the US Navy IM and HC Office
- Define Navy IM and HC roles and responsibilities
- Describe current IM and HC processes and topics
 - Joint IM Test Standards
 - Synchronization of testing criteria
 - The IMHCO



Ordnance Accidents

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IM can save lives and resources.



Bomb explosion following the tractor-trailer collision in Checotah, OK (1985).

Failures Don't Forgive



Ammunition train explosion, Roseville, CA. (1973)



Bien-Hoa Air Base, Vietnam (1965)



U.S. Army Camp Doha, Kuwait (1991)



USS Oriskany (1966) USS Forrestal (1967)



Indian Head, MD (1994)

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USS Enterprise (1969)



USS Nimitz (1981)



IM Background

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≻ IM is …

- A CNO initiative to increase ship survivability
- Acquisition-driven to integrate energetic materials and munitions design technologies that reduce weapons' reaction violence and collateral damage to heat, shock and impact stimuli while maintaining performance

IM compliance requires ...

- Passing standardized test series per JROC guidance
 - Thermal (fast cook-off; slow cook-off)
 - Impact (bullet, fragment, shaped charge jet)
 - Shock (sympathetic detonation)
- Systems approach for comprehensive solution
 - Less sensitive energetic materials (explosives, propellants)
 - Novel materials (rocket motor cases; warhead materials)
 - Packaging



IM is important to the Fleet to protect platforms and personnel from reactions of our own weapons – whether through accident, combat or terrorist activities.



IM Policies: Statute & Joint Policy

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Congressional Special Interest

• USC, Title 10, Chapter 141, Section 2389 December 2001: "2389. Ensuring safety regarding insensitive munitions. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that insensitive munitions under development or procurement are safe throughout development and fielding when subject to unplanned stimuli."

Department of Defense Policy

• **DoDD 5000.01, May 12, 2003**: E1.1.23. Safety. "... All systems containing energetics shall comply with insensitive munitions criteria."

Joint Chiefs Policy

• Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 31 July 2009


"Munitions used will be capable of resisting Insensitive Munitions (IM) threats (accidental and combat) per the established standardized IM protocols unless variations for unique circumstances are validated by the JROC."

OSD(AT&L) Policy

- OSD Memorandum: 21 July 2004. "....annual IM Strategic Plans will be the vehicle to submit and consolidate IM waiver requests."
- **OSD Memorandum: 19 March 2007.** "IM Strategic Plans will be required biennially beginning with the FY09/10 plans."



Navy IM Roles & Responsibilities





Joint IM Test Standards

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- Single set of IM Standard tests approved by JROC
 – JROCM 235-06 Nov 2006
- OUSD Memo Feb 2010
 - Test Standards Codified



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ACQUISITION TECHNOLOG FEB 0 1 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Joint Insensitive Munitions Test Standards and Compliance Assessment

The November 6, 2006, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) memorandum recommended a standardized, single set of Insensitive Munitions (IM) tests and passing criteria for use by all Components for assessing IM compliance. I approve these standard protocols, which are attached, and I also endorse the JROC's activities in validating any unique variations thereto within the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System.

Although the IM standard tests and passing criteria have been implemented for all programs since their recommendation by the JROC, and this process has been overseen by my office through the Joint Services IM Technical Panel, they have not been officially documented. Through their issuance in this memorandum, I wish to clearly direct their use for making assessments of IM compliance for all conventional munitions.

Ashton B. Carter

Attachment: As stated



IM Technical Requirements

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NEARBY HEAT **BULLETS Such** SYMPATHETIC **FUEL FIRE** FRAGMENTS SHAPED REACTION Such **CHARGE JET** Such as a truck Such as fire in as small arms Such as from IM CLASSES OF adjacent **RPG**, Bomblets, or an aircraft from terrorists bombs. as detonation of Threats on a flight deck magazine. store or combat artillery, or adjacent stores **ATGMs: Combat** THREATS ARE or vehicle. **IEDs** or terrorists RELEVANT **Fast Cook-off** Slow Cook-off **Bullet Impact** Fragment **Sympathetic** Shaped **STANDARDS ARE** Impact **Charge Jet Detonation** REPRESENTATIVE FCO **SCO** BI FI SD **SCJ** eactions **AND ONE METRIC OF MUNITION** Z **RESPONSE AND** Tests **TECHNOLOGY** MATURITY SSING Type V Type V Type III Type III Type V Type V Pa **Explosion** Burn Burn Burn Burn **Explosion**



tions	Detonation/ Partial Detonation	Explosion	Deflagration/ Propulsion	Burn	No Sustained Reaction
Reac	Type I/II	Type III	Type IV	Type V	Type VI
		and the second			



Joint IM Standards - Test Configurations

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IM Test	Number of Required Tests	Test Configuration	Test Procedure
FCO	2	1 Operational, 1 Logistical	STANAG 4240, Standard Procedure, Excluding Annex B
SCO	2	2 Logistical	STANAG 4382, Procedure 1
BI	2	1 Operational, 1 Logistical	STANAG 4241, Procedure 1
FI	2	1 Operational, 1 Logistical	STANAG 4496, Standard Procedure
SR/SD	2	2 Logistical	STANAG 4396, Procedure 1
SCJ	2	1 Operational, 1 Logistical	STANAG 4526, Procedure 2, PG-7V Surrogate (81mm precision Shaped Charge)**

•Additional testing may be required for additional threats per Threat Hazard Assessment (THA).

** PG-7V Surrogate configuration is identified by ARDEC Picatinny Arsenal DWG 7GP20078

10



Hazard Classification Definition

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- Identification of the damage potential in *transporting* and storing hazardous materials
- Includes Hazard Class/Division, Compatibility Group, Proper Shipping Name, UN Number, and Explosive Weight

1.4C Cartridges, Power Device UN0276 0.0243 Ibs




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Regulations

- DoD
 - DoD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards (DoD 6055.09-STD)
 - DoD Ammunition and Explosive Hazard Classification Procedures (NAVSEAINST 8020.8B)
 - Transportation and Storage Data for Ammunition, Explosives and Related Hazardous Materials (NAVSEA SW020-AC-SAF-010)
 - Ammunition and Explosives Safety Ashore (OP 5 Vol 1)
- National
 - Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Transportation
- International
 - UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods
 - Determination of the Hazard Classification of Military Ammunition and Explosives (STANAG 4123)



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*Navy only



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<u>Interim</u>

- Need during development
- Approved by Service
- Transportation and Storage in CONUS (Can be used for OCONUS in limited scenarios)
- Material tests and evaluation
- Requires some planning but can be assigned within 30 days


<u>Final</u>

- Need for deployment
- Approved by DoD/DOT
- Transportation and Storage DOD-wide
- Full-scale testing on articles
- Requires long range
 planning



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
Interim Hazard Classification



* Army/Air Force classification offices




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HC Test Plan Criteria

- Thermal Testing:
 - UN Test Series 3C for Substances
 - UN Test Series 4A for Articles
- Sensitivity Testing:
 - Article Drop Testing: UN Test series 4B
 - Impact: UN Test series 3A
 - Friction: UN Test Series 3B
 - Article Small Scale Burn: UN Test Series 3D
- Identifying a classification
 - Single Package: UN Test 6A
 - Sympathetic Reaction: UN Test 6B/7K
 - Liquid Fuel/External Fire: UN Test 6C/7G
 - Slow Heating: UN test 7H
 - Bullet Impact : UN Test 7J
 - Extremely Insensitive Detonating Substance (EIDS) tests: UN Test 7A through UN Test 7F

Standardized IM Tests/Passing Criteria

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JROC on 6 Nov 06 (JROCM 235-06)


NAVAL SEA

SYSTEMS COMMAND

	Threat	Passing Criteria	Comments	STANAG
FCO	Liquid Fuel Fire (e.g., truck or an aircraft on a flight deck)	Burning	HC Relation: Required for hazard classificationStimulus: Rapid heating responseComments: None	4240
sco	Slow Heating 3.3 C/Hr (e.g., fire in adjacent magazine, store or vehicle)	Burning	HC Relation: Required for reduced hazard classificationStimulus: Slow heating responseComments: Additional technical studies appropriate	4382
ві	.50 Cal M2AP 3 round burst (e.g., small arms from terrorists or combat)	Burning	HC Relation: Required for reduced hazard classificationStimulus: Low level kinetic impactComments: Relevant small arms threat More severe threats exist Additional studies appropriate	4241
FI	18.6 gram fragment 8300 +/- 300 fps (e.g., bombs, artillery, or IEDs)	Burning	HC Relation Stimulus Comments: Not required for hazard classification : Combine shock, mechanical, thermal : Artillery fragments slower Some KE and EFP threats more severe	4496
SD SD	Detonation of a single donor (detonation of adjacent stores)	Explosion	HC Relation: Required for hazard classificationStimulus: Output of a like munitionComments: Does not address mixed storage Does not address multiple donor	4396
scJ	81-mm Precision shaped charge (e.g., RPG, Bomblets, ATGMs: Combat or terrorists)	Explosion	HC Relation: Not required for hazard classificationStimulus: ShockComments: More severe threats exist Pragmatic threat considering technology potential	4526
Legend		IV	V VI Approved for put	
Detonation/ Exp Partial Detonation		flagration or pulsive reaction	Burning No sustained reaction Distribution is un	




Fast and Slow Cook Off





Bullet and Fragment Impact





Sympathetic Detonation and Shaped Charge Jet Impact

SD/SR Test Standard	Req.	Pass/Fail	•Optional "Propagation Test" in WR-50
MIL-STD-2105A (1991)	Test per THA	Acc: No Type I (Det)	Based on stowage, transportation, service use,
MIL-STD-2105C (2003)	Configuration determined by THA	≤ Type III (Explosion)	design
STANAG 4439 AOP-39 (2010)	Donor/Acc., Config. Determined by THA	≤ Type III (Explosion)	Harmonize w/ TB 700-2 HC SR test

SCJ I Test Standard	Req.	Pass/Fail
MIL-STD-2105C	50mm	≤ Type III
(2003)	Rockeye SC	(Explosion)
STANAG 4439	50mm	≤ Type III
AOP-39	Rockeye SC	(Explosion)
(2010)	Alt: 81 mm (Req'd for US)	

•81 mm SC – UN 2008
•81 mm BRL precision SC – new
standard per JROC memo, Feb 2010



- NOSSA IMHCO reviews synchronization of IM/HC test plans.
- Navy Munitions Reaction Evaluation Board (MREB) reviews all Ordnance Assessment Test plans and scores the test. (Ref: NOSSAINST 8010.1)
- Program IM/HC test plan submittal
 - IMHCO, MREB concurrence required
 - Joint approvals may be required (JSIMTP, JROC, DDESB)
- Variations from the Joint IM Test Standards require JROC approval.



NOSSA (N85) – IM and HC POCs

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IM/HC Links/Resources

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• NOSSA IM Webpage -

https://nossa.nmci.navy.mil/nrws2/Programs/InsensitiveMunitions/tabid/265/Defa ult.aspx

- Test Plan Webpage in development
- NOSSA Webpage HC Link

https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/Policy/2008 OUSD IM Handbook FINAL 05302009. pdf

 DOD Acquisition Manager's Handbook for Insensitive Munitions dated 6 Nov 2008

https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/Policy/2008_OUSD_IM_Handbook_FINAL_05302009. pdf

- Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC) http://www.msiac.nato.int/
 - MSIAC is a NATO project office. Its scope covers Munitions Safety (including Insensitive Munitions (IM) issues) across the total Life Cycle of munitions



Summary

- Mature IM and HC technology is being inserted in priority munitions where technically, programmatically, and fiscally practicable
- Navy has a well-structured IM and HC Program responsive to evaluation, policy/guidance and statute
- Shipping containers/packaging upgrades/modifications require IM and HC testing/assessment and provide a window of opportunity for IM and HC improvements.





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Backup

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


IM Terminology Guide

Table Values		Reaction Type	Color
Tested	Assessed		
	(I)	Detonation	Red
	(II)	Partial Detonation	Red
- 111	(III)	Explosion	Light Orange
IV	(IV)	Deflagration	Yellow
V	(V)	Burn	Bright Green
VI	(VI)	No sustained reaction	Turquoise
Р	(P)	Pass (SD & SCJ)	Bright Green
F	(F)	Fail (SD & SCJ)	Red
		Determined not to be	
		a credible threat per	
		approved Threat	
THA		Hazard Assessment	No color
		Not tested - Applicable	
		only to baseline	
NT		section	No color

Reaction types are defined in MIL-STD 2105C

Terms	Definition		
	All munitions/items containing energetic material, determined		
Priority Munition	by the PEO to benefit from IM-improvement based on		
	prioritization criteria. All developmental items shall be		
	categorized as Priority Items.		
Tier I	Non IM-compliant priority items w/fully funded POA&Ms		
Tier II	Non IM-compliant priority items w/o fully funded POA&Ms		
Tier III	Non IM-compliant, non-priority items being procured by		
	another PEO/Service		
Tier IV	Non IM-compliant, non-priority items being procured by		
	reporting PEO/Service		
Tier V	Non-priority items w/no further procurement and no window of		
	opportunity anticipated		
Tier VI	IM-compliant, non-priority items being procured by another		
	PEO/Service (compliant equivalent of Tier III)		
	IM-compliant, non-priority items being procured by reporting		
Tier VII	PEO/Service (compliant equivalent of Tier IV)		





Test Configuration Definitions

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- Logistical Configuration (Storage, Shipping, or Transportation): The logistical configuration is intended to be synonymous with the packaged configuration in which the munition is stored, shipped, or transported. In the event that ammunition has different storage, shipping, or transportation configurations, multiple configurations or at least the configuration expected to result in the reaction providing the maximum credible event will be tested.
- Operational Configuration: The operational configuration is intended to be synonymous with the tactical configuration in which a munition is ready to be employed as in an All-Up-Round (AUR) in a bare state. In the case where a munition is not removed from its packaging and shipping container prior to employment, the logistical configuration testing should be replicated where standardized testing specifies any operational configuration tests.

Ref: OUSD Memo Feb 2010

MREB



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- Munitions Reaction Evaluation Board (MREB) formed (2009)
 NOSSAINST 8010.1
- MREB Objectives
 - Ordnance Hazard Assessment Testing (IM/HC/Basic Safety)
 - Evaluates/Provides Guidance on Test plans
 - Provides Official Assessment of Record of Test Reactions
 - Establishes Process Guide and Reporting Format
- NOSSA approves/disapproves final MREB recommendations/findings and reactions



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY NAVAL ORDNANCE SAFETY AND BECURITY ACTIVITY FARRAGUT HALL 3317 STRAUSS AVENUE, SUITE 108 INDIAN HEAD, NO 20540-3151

> NO8SAINST 8010.1 Ser N832/1830 24 Jul 09

NOSSA INSTRUCTION 8010.1

From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)

Subj: MUNITIONS REACTION EVALUATION BOARD (MREB)

Ref: (a) NAVSEAINST 8010.5 (b) MIL-STD-2105, Hazard Assessment Tests for Non-Nuclear Munitions (c) NAVSEAINST 8020.8 (d) JROCM 235-06 (e) JROCM 102-05

 Purpose. To state the mission, authority, responsibility, and membership of the Department of the Navy (DON) Munitions Reaction Evaluation Board (MREB).

2. Mission. To provide guidance and recommendations for the proper design and conduct of ordnance hazard assessment testing which comprises all or some of the tests described in references (a), (b), and (c).

3. <u>Objective</u>. To provide evaluation of ordnance hazard assessment test plans and scoring of technical performance (test/no-test and reaction level) of hazard besting in support of Insensitive Munitions (IM) compliance, Tazard Classification (NC), and Weapon Systems Explosives Safety Review Board (NSESRB) review processes for munitions.

4. Background. Since the implementation of the IM policy by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1984, IM issues have received increasing attention within the Department of Defense (DeD). One example is that Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has approved Standardised IM tests per reference (d). In its execution of IM policy and procedures, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is also striving to harmonize IM and RC testing. Weapon system programs are frequently Joint Service programs or the weapons are operating in a Joint Warfighter Environment par reference (e). Therefore, Joint safety requirements are becoming more important to implement and evaluate. With the increased levels of Joint oversight, it is